05 / THE CONFLICT BENEATH THE CONFLICT
Political power, theology, recognition and sovereignty. The arguments underneath the headlines.
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The Muslim Brotherhood, Sovereignty, and Peace
The status reversal nobody wants to discuss
I keep hearing arguments about which Zionist said what, who arrived when, and which label ends the conversation. Here is the question I want put back on the table: was some of the opposition to Jewish sovereignty also an objection to Jews ceasing to be subordinate?
My contention is that inherited cultural hierarchy helps explain a strand of rejectionism that a story about borders alone misses. A people once offered protection within somebody else’s order became a people governing themselves. The former protected minority no longer needed permission. I believe that reversal mattered. The historical record gives us reasons to investigate it seriously. It does not give us access to every Palestinian’s private motives.
Protection is not equality
This is a cultural argument, not only a theological one. An expectation can outlive the law that formed it. A ruler can sincerely regard himself as generous while the person he protects experiences dependence. Those are not mutually exclusive descriptions.
Jessica Marglin’s study of nineteenth-century Morocco shows officials adopting the language of equality while retaining the framework of dhimma rather than religious egalitarianism. That is a specific history, not fourteen centuries frozen into one identical experience. Jewish life under Muslim rule varied enormously. Protection and cultural achievement did not erase legal subordination; persecution did not describe every place and period. Marglin: A New Language of Equality.
There is a revealing example in Shay Hazkani’s Dear Palestine, page 53. In his account of Sultan Muhammad V’s May 1948 proclamation, opposition to Zionism sits alongside an instruction not to attack Moroccan Jews and an invocation of their established protected position. Hazkani reads that language through dhimma. I find the combination important: protection within the existing order, opposition to Jewish sovereignty outside it. This is a historian’s account of one proclamation, not proof of a whole population’s psychology. Hazkani, Dear Palestine.
When the prohibition is actually written down
We do not have to invent a hidden motive where a movement states its position. Article 11 of Hamas’s 1988 covenant treats Palestine as an Islamic endowment that no ruler or organization may surrender. Article 31 offers coexistence under Islamic sovereignty, not competing sovereignty for other faiths. That is a political hierarchy, not just a disagreement about where to draw a line. Read articles 11 and 31.
But keep the dates and actors straight. Hamas’s 2017 document distinguishes Jews as a religious community from Zionism, and accepts a Palestinian state on the 1967 lines as a national-consensus formula. It also refuses recognition of Israel’s legitimacy and retains its whole-Palestine claim. The shift matters; so does the limit. Neither document can retrospectively establish what every opponent of partition believed in 1947. 2017 document, paragraphs 16 and 19–20.
1947: a choice that deserves an answer
The sharpest challenge is not a guess about feelings. It is a decision. The UN Palestine Commission reported that the Jewish community generally accepted partition while the Arab community generally opposed it; the Arab Higher Committee refused cooperation. The committee’s own presentation opposed partition in principle. Its leadership would not accept an Arab state alongside a Jewish state on the terms offered. That choice deserves scrutiny, not disappearance from the story. UN Commission, March 1948 · Arab Higher Committee, September 1947.
My question is whether the refusal reflected more than disagreement about the proposed map: did accepting Jews as sovereign equals itself feel like an unacceptable concession? Rejection makes that question legitimate. It does not, by itself, prove the answer. Arab representatives also claimed the whole country as their homeland and argued for majority self-determination. We have to confront their stated case even when we reject its conclusion.
Nor was partition merely changing a symbol on a flag. A December 1947 British parliamentary answer estimated 498,000 Jews and 405,000 Arabs and others in the proposed Jewish state, including settled and Bedouin residents, using end-1946 figures. For those Arabs, minority status, immigration and future political control were real concerns. Resolution 181 provided for citizenship, equality and property protections, not a requirement to expel them. A serious argument can defend Jewish statehood without pretending the proposed change was cost-free for everyone else. Revised-plan population estimate · Resolution 181.
Do not remove Jewish fear from the chronology
When people discuss transfer, they must distinguish the British Peel proposal of 1937 from the UN partition plan of 1947. They must also remember the violence that preceded 1937. The Shaw Commission recorded the 1929 massacres and the holy-sites campaign that inflamed the atmosphere. It attributed a share of responsibility to the Mufti for that atmosphere, without finding proof that he personally organized the outbreak. Jewish insecurity was real. It was not invented later to decorate an argument. Shaw Commission excerpts, especially pages 63–77.
Would Ben-Gurion have considered transfer without the earlier attacks? We cannot run that alternative history. Violence and insecurity belong in the explanation; demographic ambitions and Palestinian fears belong there too. Explaining why separation appealed does not make every proposed means of achieving it defensible. Neither does a discussion of transfer prove that every Jew came intending to displace someone.
The evidence that challenges my thesis
If I want readers to interrogate their assumptions, I cannot hide the documents that complicate mine. In 1993 the PLO recognized Israel’s right to exist in peace and security. The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative offered peace and normal relations in exchange for withdrawal, Palestinian statehood and an agreed refugee solution. These were conditional political commitments, not the end of every dispute. But they contradict a claim that Arab or Muslim recognition is eternally impossible. 1993 recognition letters · Arab Peace Initiative.
They narrow the argument rather than abolish it: inherited hierarchy may help explain particular movements, rhetoric and refusals. It cannot explain everything. Palestinian attachment to home, fear of displacement and desire for national independence are not automatically disguises for wounded superiority. A hypothesis that treats every denial as confirmation is not an investigation. It is a trap.
Reverse the status. Keep the principle.
Imagine telling Jews: you may live here, practise your religion and be protected, but political independence is not for you. Would we call that equality? Now ask the same question when Palestinians face permanent dependence on Israeli power. My objection to subordination has to survive the change of subject.
So here is my challenge to Palestinian leaders, to their advocates, and to anyone explaining this conflict: what political future makes room for Jewish self-determination as a legitimate end in itself, not merely a temporary fact to tolerate until it can be reversed? And the reciprocal question to us is unavoidable: what future makes room for Palestinian self-determination and equal citizenship rather than permanent domination?
I am not asking Palestinians to prove an invisible motive absent from every mind. I am asking political programs to show their answer in their terms, their recognition and their conduct. Show me a durable commitment to two peoples living freely, and that is evidence against rejectionism. Show me a permanent religious or national veto on Jewish sovereignty anywhere, and the problem is bigger than a border.
The argument is not that Jews deserve to change places with their former rulers and become somebody else’s masters. It is that we were never obliged to remain anyone’s dependants. Equality is not permission. It has to work in both directions.
The Muslim Brotherhood — The Operating System
To understand Hamas, you have to understand the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928. Hamas's own 1988 covenant identifies it as a branch of that movement. That connection is not a theory imposed by its enemies. It is in its founding document.
Al-Banna opposed Western influence and secularisation. His movement treated Islam as a basis for politics and society, not only personal religious practice. That ambition matters to the argument here: this was a programme for power as well as a programme for belief.
My objection is to the political claim that one religious order should govern everyone else. Faith is not the problem. Supremacy is. I would apply that distinction to my own people too.
The Brotherhood's history includes preaching, social organisation, political participation, and violence. Those strands cannot be collapsed into a single account of every member, every branch, or every Muslim. They also cannot be used to make Hamas's own commitments disappear.
Read Hamas's charter. Its original text presents the land as an Islamic endowment and rejects negotiated peace initiatives. That is why I cannot hear its language simply as a demand to move a border. I hear an argument that leaves no legitimate place for Jewish sovereignty.
Enter Izz ad-Din al-Qassam — a Syrian-born preacher who had fled French rule in Syria and ended up as an imam in Haifa, where he built networks among Palestinian peasants and urban poor, preaching moral reform alongside calls for armed jihad. He founded the Black Hand — a clandestine jihadist cell that attacked Jewish settlements and British infrastructure. He was killed in a British manhunt in 1935, became a martyr, and inspired the Arab Revolt of 1936. Hamas named its military wing after him. Not after a statesman. Not after a diplomat. After a Syrian cleric who wanted holy war against Jews in Palestine ninety years ago. The name tells you everything about the goal.
Sayyid Qutb, executed in Egypt in 1966, helped shape later jihadist thought through his writings. Influence is not the same thing as a single organisational family tree. Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hamas are distinct organisations with different histories. We should be precise about them precisely because the danger is serious.
The same precision should apply to religious authorities invoked to justify violence. A cleric's prestige does not make attacks on civilians moral. A theological vocabulary does not turn the murder of a child into something else.
Regional alliances change. Governments sponsor, suppress, or accommodate Islamist movements for different reasons. Calling all of those actors “the Brotherhood” explains less than it appears to. The question I care about is concrete: who supports violence, who excuses it, and who is willing to recognise a Jewish state?
In the West, the same standard applies. Assess organisations by documented actions and stated positions. A Muslim civil-rights organisation is not guilty by association simply because it is Muslim. If there is evidence of support for violence, show it. If there isn't, insinuation is not an argument.
For me, Hamas's founding text exposes a central obstacle: when sovereignty becomes a sacred prohibition, compromise becomes betrayal. You cannot negotiate a workable border with someone whose starting position is that your state has no right to exist anywhere.
The uncurious call it resistance. It has a name. It has founders. It has a charter. It has a military wing named after a Syrian preacher who wanted holy war. And it has been very, very patient.
Equality, not permission
Classical Islamic legal traditions used categories such as Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb: the house of Islam and the house of war. Their meanings and application varied. They are not a reliable description of what every Muslim believes today. My concern is with political movements that turn religious history into a permanent veto on other people's sovereignty.
Jews lived for centuries under Muslim rule, sometimes with substantial communal security and cultural flourishing, sometimes under persecution. Dhimmi status could offer protection while also imposing legal inequality. Neither a golden-age postcard nor an uninterrupted horror story does justice to that history. What I refuse is the idea that protected subordination should be enough for us now.
We did not come home to ask for a more comfortable version of dependence. We came to govern ourselves. I suspect some of the rage directed at Israel comes from that reversal: a people accustomed to needing permission no longer waits for it. That is my interpretation. It is not a diagnosis of every Arab or Muslim.
What infuriates me is leadership that turns suffering into a permanent political strategy. Palestinian children deserve a future that is not organised around our disappearance. Israeli children deserve a future that is not organised around surviving the next attack. Those are not competing moral claims.
Humiliation can become political fuel. So can fear. Neither makes an entire culture incapable of compromise. Leaders choose whether to feed those emotions or build a future beyond them. I judge them by that choice.
The wider Arab world has its own responsibilities here. Solidarity expressed in speeches is not the same thing as a durable future for Palestinian people. Nor is invoking their suffering a licence to pursue unrelated regional ambitions. Look at what governments actually do.
And look at the stories people find comforting. Jewish success is too often explained as something dark, conspiratorial, and therefore illegitimate. The uncurious consume that story because it is emotionally satisfying and requires no homework.
The uncurious also like to separate Zionism from Judaism. To treat one as a political movement they can oppose and the other as a religion they must at least nominally respect. But for us there is hardly a meaningful distinction. Israel is not a political add-on to Jewish identity. It is woven into the prayer, the calendar, the language, the long memory of a people that faced every direction except one when it prayed. To call yourself anti-Zionist while claiming to have no problem with Jews is a sentence our encoded DNA has heard before. Different word. Same meaning. We know the sound of it.
The argument underneath
On food, at least, let's keep our sense of proportion. Recipes cross borders. People carry them, adapt them, argue about them, and feed their children with them. You can honour a dish's history without turning hummus into a sovereignty test.
Family, identity, and nation
The hamulot—the extended families and clans—are part of Palestinian social and political history. Family and local loyalties do not disprove national identity. Jewish communal differences don't disprove ours either. The useful question is how those loyalties shaped politics, not whether they allow us to declare another people unreal.
The main hamulot of pre-state Palestine:
Jerusalem & surroundings: Husseini (most politically dominant, produced Haj Amin al-Husseini); Nashashibi (rival to Husseinis); Khalidi; Nuseibeh; Dajani; Budayri; Jarallah
Hebron area: Tamimi; Jabari; Qawasmeh
Nablus area: Tuqan; Abd al-Hadi; Masri; Nabulsi
Haifa & coast: Khalil; Zu'bi
Gaza area: Shawa; Sourani; Rayes
Galilee: Zu'bi; Fahum; Nimr
General/widespread: Barghouthi; Hanbali; Qasim
These names represent lives and histories, not an argument for denying rights. I expect the same recognition in return: Jewish identity is not a political costume, and our connection to this land did not begin when Europe became unbearable.
Palestinians claim they are unseen by Israelis. It is actually Israelis who are unseen. Their history misunderstood, their motivations permanently questioned, their fears treated as propaganda. Seventy-five years of bombings, kidnappings, stabbings, rockets, and tunnel warfare — unacknowledged, unremarked upon, absorbed as though it were the normal background noise of a people who simply chose to live this way. The fear Israelis feel knowing their immediate neighbors want to kill them, knowing the surrounding countries despise them — that fear is invisible to the world. What kind of life is that? It is the kind of life that living without it is actually worse. Because what waits on the other side of no Israel is not peace. It is what came before Israel. And we remember what came before Israel. It is in the DNA.
Why Don't Palestinians Come to Us?
International pressure cannot substitute forever for an agreement between the people who have to live beside each other. Palestinians have negotiated directly with Israel, and the PLO recognised Israel in 1993. The problem is that the process has not delivered a durable peace. I want leadership on both sides willing to turn recognition into a future people can actually inhabit. Hamas's rejection of Israel is an obstacle to that future, not a shortcut to it.
The Peace Deals Israel Offered — And What Happened
The history of diplomacy matters. So does getting it right. Failed negotiations are not all the same event, and a list of dates is not proof that every Palestinian rejected every possible peace. Here are several turning points that shape how I read the conflict.
1947: partition. The UN proposed Jewish and Arab states, with a separate international arrangement for Jerusalem. Jewish leadership accepted the plan; Arab leadership rejected it. The proposed Jewish state covered roughly 56 percent of Mandatory Palestine west of the Jordan, including much of the Negev.
2. After 1967 — Israel offered to return captured territories in exchange for peace and recognition. The Arab League responded with the Khartoum Resolution — "No peace, no recognition, no negotiations." Three no's. In writing.
2000: Camp David and the Clinton Parameters. Camp David ended without agreement in July. Clinton's more detailed parameters came in December. These were distinct stages, and accounts of the negotiations differ. Conflating them into one precise offer makes the history sound simpler than it was.
2001: Taba. The talks ended without an agreement. The joint statement said the sides had never been closer and believed the remaining gaps could be bridged after the Israeli elections. That is different from saying Arafat simply walked away from a finished deal.
2008: Olmert and Abbas. Olmert presented proposals involving territory, land swaps, Jerusalem, and refugees. No agreement was concluded. The competing accounts of the maps, timing, and remaining gaps deserve more care than a slogan about a blank cheque refused.
2020: the Trump plan. Palestinian leadership rejected the US proposal. It was not a jointly negotiated agreement. Its reception belongs in the history, but it does not resolve the argument about what terms could sustain two sovereign states.
There is another part of the record: peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, the PLO's recognition of Israel, and the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, which offered normal relations in exchange for withdrawal and Palestinian statehood. None made every disagreement vanish. All complicate the claim that recognition has never been possible.
I still believe rejectionism has cost generations their future. I also believe the argument is stronger when it can survive the documents.
The Historical Record — 1947, 1948, and What Actually Happened
1947 belongs beside 1948 in this history. Partition offered a political division of the land. War followed. Jewish independence and Palestinian displacement are both part of what happened. One people's national beginning does not make another people's loss imaginary.
Furthermore — the claim that Arabs welcomed Jewish immigration is a revision of history so brazen it barely deserves a response, except that it gets made constantly so it must be answered. The Arab leadership pressured the British through political means to restrict Jewish immigration via the White Papers — most devastatingly the 1939 White Paper, which severely limited Jewish entry into Palestine at the precise moment Jews most desperately needed somewhere to go. While Europe was burning Jews, the Arab leadership was lobbying to keep the door shut. And when political pressure wasn't enough, there was violence: the 1929 Hebron massacre, in which Arab mobs killed 67 Jews in one of the oldest Jewish communities in the world. The 1936-1939 Arab Revolt, years of sustained violence against Jewish civilians. "They welcomed us" is not history. It is a lie told to people who won't check.
Plan Dalet and the history we have to face
Plan Dalet was a Haganah military plan drawn up in 1948. Its meaning and implementation remain subjects of historical debate; its provisions included circumstances in which villages could be destroyed and inhabitants expelled. It should not be described as a document that contained no possibility of expulsion.
Israel faced a war for survival. Palestinians experienced mass displacement, through flight and expulsions. Those facts belong in the same account. The existence of Arab citizens in Israel today does not settle what happened to people who could not return.
What I reject is the easy analogy that treats Jews as foreign settlers with a mother country waiting to take us back. We have no such country. Our history and attachment to this land are real. So are the obligations that come with having power over another people's lives.
The Nazi Comparison — Where the Analogy Destroys Itself
Comparing Israel to Nazi Germany is not a substitute for examining Israeli policy. It often lands with a particular cruelty: the trauma through which our families understand danger is turned into an accusation against our existence.
The Holocaust, the Nakba, and the wars of this region have distinct histories. Describe specific acts. Bring evidence. Apply the relevant standards. Don't make a historical analogy do all the work, and don't treat Jewish memory as a punchline.
If you believe Palestine should exist beside Israel, we have somewhere to begin. My Zionism means Jewish self-determination; it does not require denying Palestinian self-determination. When someone says “anti-Zionist,” I want to know what they mean in practice. Criticism of a government? Equal rights? Or the disappearance of the Jewish state? Those are different positions. Ask the question.
Two states: what I believe
I believe in a Palestinian state in the West Bank—Judea and Samaria. Even as someone who believes in G-d, who knows how deeply that land is woven into Jewish history, I cannot in good conscience deny another people their right to self-determination.
Israel must remain a democracy. I don't see how it does that without a two-state solution in some form. Let Moshiach come and iron out the final details—that's above my pay grade. But subjugating another people is not the answer either.
I am not casual about the danger. Borders, security, recognition, and leadership willing to keep an agreement are not footnotes. After October 7, asking Israelis to take those questions on faith is not serious. Neither is pretending that permanent domination is a future worth defending.
Money, influence, and the story that travels
States use money and diplomacy to shape the stories told about them. Universities, media, and international organisations should be open to scrutiny. But a chain of insinuations is not proof of a coordinated operation. Follow a specific payment, document, or institutional decision. Let the evidence carry the claim.
One concrete example of a political label acquiring institutional authority is the UN General Assembly's 1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism. The Assembly revoked that determination in 1991. Both decisions belong in the record. A resolution is a political act; it is not the end of curiosity.
What comes next
What does an awake, unapologetic Jew do next? Lives. Learns. Builds. Argues honestly. Refuses to make a sales pitch for being human. I want my daughters to inherit that kind of confidence, and a world in which it does not require armour.
Sources and context
Council on Foreign Relations: the Brotherhood’s history
Israeli–Palestinian joint statement at Taba, 2001
UN report describing the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative
UN resolution 46/86, revoking the 1975 determination